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Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the
Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in
Customary International Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws prohibiting hate speech in the international and
domestic arenas demonstrate a growing concern with the
prevention and punishment of hate speech.' Hate speech is
"speech designed to promote hatred on the basis of race, religion,
ethnicity or national origin. ' The word "nigger" falls within the
definition of hate speech, as it is used to promote hatred on the
basis of race or ethnicity.3
Hagan v. Australia illustrates the development of customary
international law (CIL) regarding the prohibition of hate speech.
1. See generally Michael Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2003) (demonstrating international
and domestic reaction to hate speech); see also Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech
and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57 (1992)
(finding a correlation between the concern over hate speech and the laws prohibiting hate
speech).
2. Rosenfeld, supra note 1.
3. The Webster's International Dictionary defines "nigger" as "a member... of any
dark-skinned race." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1527 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 2002). "[The term is]
taken to be offensive." Id. An American dictionary defines "nigger" as an offensive slang
used as a disparaging term for a black person or a dark-skinned person. THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 922 (Houghton Mifflin Company 3d ed. 1997). The
word "nigger" has been intrinsically associated with the theory of white supremacy and
with the subjugation of blacks in the United States as a way to justify the institution of
slavery. See Michele Goodwin, Nigger and the Construction of Citizenship, 76 TEMP. L.
REV. 129, 154-57 (2003). An Australian dictionary identifies the word similarly, as a racist
term used to refer to an Australian Aborigine or a member of "any dark-skinned race."
MACQUARIE DICTIONARY, at http://www.macquariedictionary.com.au/
anonymous@CA11959862+0/-/p/dict/slang-n.html (last visited January 9, 2005). The
Australian dictionary's definition of "nigger" reveals a parallel history of subjugation in
Australia regarding the Australian Aborigines.
4. Hagan v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Elim. of Racial Discrim. Comm., 62d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003) [hereinafter Hagan].
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In Hagan, a U.N. Committee held that the word "nigger"
displayed on an Australian sports stadium sign was offensive based
on "circumstances of contemporary society. ' The local Aborigine
community, which is the local "contemporary society" involved
here, however, opposed the removal of the sign.6 If not the
Australian contemporary society, to which "contemporary society"
was the Committee referring?
This note will argue that Hagan's holding, which contradicts
the circumstances of Australian "contemporary society," is an
indication of an arising CIL regarding the prohibition of hate
speech. Part II will set out the legal background, which includes an
overview of Hagan v. Australia, and the legal standard this Note
applies in finding whether a CIL exists regarding a prohibition of
hate speech. Part III will survey the current state of international
law, domestic hate speech law of influential nations, and the
opinion of jurists, and conclude that there is an arising notion of
CIL regarding hate speech.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Hagan v. Australia
Petitioner Stephen Hagan, of Aborigine descent, brought
Hagan v. Australia to the Committee on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (the Committee)' requesting the removal of the
"E.S. 'Nigger' Brown" sign naming a stand in a sports stadium in
Toowoomba, Queensland ("Stadium").' The stand is named after
a famous rugby player of the 1920s9 that received the nickname
either "because of his fair skin and blond hair or because he had a
penchant for using 'Nigger Brown' shoe polish."'" Toowoomba's
Aborigine community did not support Hagan's position that the
term "nigger" was offensive and that it should be removed from
5. Id. 7.3.
6. Id. 2.2.
7. The Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination is the organ responsible
for monitoring compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP
DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 138 (1998).
8. Hagan T 1, 2.1.
9. Kathy Marks, Australia to Stand Firm Over Racist Sign, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), April 26, 2003, at 14.
10. Hagan 2.1.
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the stand."
In April 2003, the Committee held that the term "nigger" was
offensive and recommended that the stadium remove the sign.1
2
The Stadium management, however, declined to take down the
sign'3 and the Australian government did nothing to force the
Stadium to adopt the Committee's ruling.4
B. Legal Standard
The guidelines set out by modern jurisprudence will guide this
Note's analysis as to whether a CIL regarding a hate speech
prohibition exists. CIL results from a "general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."' 5 Opinio juris is another term that refers to the "sense
of legal obligation" CIL inspires in nations. 6 Opinio juris informs a
variety of nations' domestic and international actions. For
example, domestic courts apply CIL, domestic governments will
comply with CIL and incorporate it into domestic legislation,
violations of CIL may cause wars, and international treaties may
codify CIL."
Evidence of CIL is in domestic and international actions. A
clear way to detect CIL is to see whether all nations act out of a
sense of legal obligation regarding a certain norm.'9 It is not clear,
however, when a notion becomes CIL and how much state
consensus is necessary to indicate opinio juris.2 Even when there is
11. See Hagan 2.2; Patrick Goodenough, Australians Shrug off UN Ruling on
Offending Word, CNSNEWS.COM PACIFIC RIM, May 2, 2003, available at
http://www.cnsnews.comLViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=/ForeignBureaus/archive/200305
/FOR20030502a.html.
12. Hagan 7.3, 8.
13. Marks, supra note 9.
14. AAP, UN Racism Ruling Ignored, THE MERCURY (Australia), July 12, 2003, at
15, available at 2003 WLNR 7956161; Darrell Giles, "Beattie a Racist" Charge, SUNDAY
MAIL (Queensland, Australia), Aug. 17, 2003, at 28, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library,
AUSPUB File.
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987).
16. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between
Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 641 (2000)
[hereinafter Goldsmith I].
17. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith II].
18. See id. at 1113 (listing the various sources that are "often viewed as evidence of
CIL").
19. See id. at 1116 (defining CIL as requiring a "sense of legal obligation").
20. Goldsmith II, supra note 17, at 1114.
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no international consensus regarding CIL, there is other evidence
that indicates the existence of CIL.
Jurists have found evidence of CIL in treaties, international
court decisions, domestic court decisions, domestic legislation, as
well as writings of jurists.2' These are the places where this Note
will look for an indication of CIL prohibiting hate speech.
This Note proposes that the Hagan Committee's holding is an
indication of an arising notion of CIL. Since this notion of hate
speech prohibition may be ripening into CIL, sources that present
a clear-cut customary international rule against hate speech are
not available. Therefore, this Note gathers treaty provisions, an
international court's decision, domestic law of several leading
nations, and works of jurists to paint a portrait of a growing
consensus on the prohibition of hate speech.
III. ANALYSIS
The post-World War II international community realized that
beyond simple communication, hate speech can be an effective
tool of racial and ethnic subjugation." In fact, Professor Schabas
has argued that "[t]he road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with
hate speech." 3 Nations responded by enacting domestic and treaty
law to address hate speech and to prevent its harmful effects. '
This Note surveys and analyzes evidence of CIL prohibiting
hate speech. Upon examining treaties, international court
decisions, various domestic laws, and jurists' opinions, this Note
will show that the arising CIL prohibiting hate speech compelled
the Hagan committee to determine that the "nigger" sign should
be removed from the stadium.
21. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (discussing other sources used as
evidence of international law, partially quoting Chancellor Kent); 48 C.J.S. International
Law § 2 (2004); International Law, 1995 CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST §13;
Goldsmith II, supra note 17, at 1117.
22. See Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1525 (explaining the international community's
awareness of the link between racist propaganda and the Holocaust); see also Defeis,
supra note 1, at 68-69, 71 (showing the connection of hate speech to the Holocaust, and
explaining that speech rights "may [not] be asserted to destroy [rights of non-
discrimination]").
23. William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 MCGILL
L.J. 141, 144 (2000).
24. See Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1525.
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A. Treaties
CIL and treaties are the two primary forms of international
law.' However, international treaties may greatly influence the
formation of CIL or even codify CIL. This Note surveys two
widely supported treaties that prohibit hate speech.
i. ICERD
About 170 nations are parties to the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD),26 demonstrating the international community's sweeping
support to the treaty. The ICERD is the main tool for the
international community to combat racial discrimination.27 This
treaty is valuable because it has universal reach, it is legally
binding, and it has self-implementation tools.'
Article 4 of the ICERD prohibits hate speech in the form of
propaganda that incites racial discrimination.29 ICERD's Article 4
goes beyond the hate speech prohibition in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because only
Article 4 requires the state parties to criminalize hate speech. ° The
broad support for the treaty demonstrates the international
community's commitment to the criminalization of hate speech."
25. Goldsmith II, supra note 17, at 1113.
26. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications
and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/2.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005).
27. Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283, 283 (1985).
28. Id.
29. Article 4 of ICERD states in part:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination
and, to this end...:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination....
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 352, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan.
4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD].
30. Id.
31. During ratification of the treaty, several nations expressed concern that article 4
might unnecessarily impede in the right to freedom of opinion and expression, as
illustrated by their interpretations of article 4 and reservations of rights under article 4.
Despite these concerns, however, none of the signatory nations chose not to be bound by
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ii. ICCPR
The ICCPR also addresses the problem of hate speech. The
ICCPR is an attempt to implement the rights in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights through binding agreements.
Article 20(2) prohibits advocacy of racial and national hatred
when it constitutes an incitement to discrimination.33 About 150
countries are parties to the ICCPR, none of whom object to article
2 0 (2 ),' demonstrating the international community's strong
support to the prohibition of hate speech.
Both the ICERD and the ICCPR prohibit hate speech. The
ICERD goes as far as requiring states to criminalize hate speech.35
These two treaties demonstrate the international community's
growing concern with the prevention and prohibition of hate
speech. Hagan v. Australia was a result of this growing concern. If
the Aborigine community in Hagan failed to find the questioned
sign offensive, then another reason must underlie the Committee's
holding. Within the context of the treaties surveyed above, that
reason is the arising CIL prohibiting hate speech.
B. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
The ICTR decided Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, &
Ngeze, a case that explicitly states that prohibition of hate speech
has become CIL.' The ICTR, after examining well-established
principles of international and domestic law and international and
domestic cases, found that "hate speech that expresses.
discrimination violates the norm of customary international law
article 4. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/2.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005). The nations concerned about article 4 were: Antigua &
Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Fiji, France, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Malta, Monaco, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, Tonga, Thailand, Tonga,
and the United Kingdom.
32. Defeis, supra note 1, at 78.
33. Article 20(2) states: "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility to violence shall be prohibited by law."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 6
I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR].
34. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications
and Reservations available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
35. ICERD art. 4.
36. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,
Judgment and Sentence, 1076 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at http://65.18.216.88/default.htm.
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prohibiting discrimination.""
The ICTR's decision reflects the position of the international
community. The United Nations Security Council created the
ICTR,38 which demonstrates the ICTR is an organ backed by the
international community. This influential international organ has
spoken about hate speech prohibition as a matter of CIL. This is
further support that the Hagan Committee's holding is justified by
an arising CIL prohibiting hate speech.
C. Domestic Law"
CIL is a norm that states follow in a consistent manner out of
a sense of legal obligation.4" It is unclear, however, how consistent
state practice must be and which states must follow the norm for it
to be accepted as CIL. 1 Some scholars believe that a survey of
nations should include only "major powers and interested
nations."" The nations surveyed in this Note are the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and Russia. Although not
a comprehensive list,43 this list includes major nations in terms of
political influence and economic power. These states are also
"interested nations" in the sense that they have experienced the
harmful effects of hate speech in varying degrees.
i. United States
Freedom of speech, beyond being one of the most respected
constitutional guarantees, is also "one of America's foremost
cultural symbols."" Unlike other Western nations, where hate
speech is prohibited entirely, the American approach may in fact
37. Id.
38. Stuart Beresford, In Pursuit of International Justice: The First Four-Year Term of
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 99, 104-05
(2000).
39. A survey of the current practices regarding hate speech in each nation of the
world is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, this Note's analysis of domestic law
focuses solely on international trends of hate speech law seen in the law of a variety of
influential nations' domestic law.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1987).
41. Goldsmith II, supra note 17, at 1114.
42. Id.
43. Outside of the nations surveyed in this Note, other nations have adopted hate
speech legislation, including Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, France, Senegal and Sweden.
Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of
International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 9 n.46 (1996).
44. Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1529.
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allow some types of hate speech under the protection of freedom
of speech. 5 Out of the nations this Note surveys, the American
approach to the prohibition of hate speech is the most attenuated.
This approach reflects the constant conflict between freedom of
speech and protection against discrimination.
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,46 the Supreme Court struck down
a city ordinance prohibiting cross-burning that is intended to
"arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender." 7 The Court held that the
ordinance was impermissibly selective in its application of the
ordinance; that it only applied to fighting words that insult or
provoke violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender."' By implication, fighting words used in connection with
other ideas, such as hostility based on political affiliation, are not
covered. 9 The Court's holding in this case seems to indicate the
United States is more committed to freedom of speech, to the
detriment of hate speech law.
A subsequent case, however, seems to modify this position.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the legislature may regulate
certain types of speech, including certain hate speech." In Virginia
v. Black,' the Supreme Court gave new hope to anti-hate speech
law proponents. 2 The Court in Virginia found that cross burnings
performed on someone's lawn is a form of unprotected
intimidation rather than protected speech. 3 Virginia allowed hope
for proponents of hate speech regulation that was not thought
possible after the R.A. V. holding. 4
The Supreme Court's move from R.A.V. to Virginia shows
that, even in a nation where freedom of speech is held as one of
the most sacred Constitutional guarantees, hate speech law is an
arising concern.
45. Id.
46. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
47. Id. at 380.
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id.
50. See Chris Demaske, Modern Power and the First Amendment: Reassessing Hate
Speech, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 273,315 (2004).
51. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
52. See Demaske, supra note 50, at 315.
53. 538 U.S. at 362-363; see also Demaske, supra note 50, at 314.
54. Demaske, supra note 50, at 315.
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ii. Canada
Over the past seven years, hate speech regulation in Canada
has expanded and strengthened.5 The Parliament has recently
expanded hate speech regulation to include a prohibition of hate
speech based on sexual orientation.56 The number of prosecutions
of hate speech crimes has also increased in the past seven years,"
which shows a greater government commitment to prosecuting
such crimes.
In Regina v. Keegstra,"8 the Canadian Supreme Court created
the momentum necessary to boost the anti-hate speech regulation
Canada has witnessed in the past few years. In Keegstra, the
Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of a teacher who
made anti-Semitic statements to his students. 9 The criminal statute
under which Keegstra was convicted, prohibited "promotion of
hatred . .. towards any section of the public distinguished by
colour, race, religion or ethnic origin."' The Keegstra holding and
the subsequent governmental actions reaffirm Canada's
commitment to hate speech prohibition.
iii. United Kingdom
Unlike the other nations this Note surveys, the United
Kingdom has criminalized hate speech for centuries.6' Since the
seventeenth century, there have been generations of British
regulations addressing hate speech.62 The first generation of hate
speech regulation punished individuals the government believed
posed a threat to the monarchy.63 The government, however, also
applied these same regulations to criminalize speech intended to
bring hatred against racial and ethnic minorities. '
The regulations evolved over the years to the current body of
hate speech law. Today the government has a broad range of tools
55. Terry Heinrichs, Hate Speech, Broadly Defined, NATIONAL POST, July 21, 2004,
at A14.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.).
59. Id. at 698; Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1542.
60. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 319(2) (1980) (Can.).
61. Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
62. Id. at 1545.
63. Id.
64. See id. (explaining that the seditious libel offense also punished statements which
promoted "hostility between different classes").
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to fight hate speech, including the ability to punish speech that
promotes "hatred through persuasion of non-target audiences"
and speech that amounts to "harassment of a target group or
individual., 65 The United Kingdom's hate speech law history
demonstrates the nation's commitment to prohibiting hate speech.
iv. Germany
Germany developed a stronger and more encompassing body
of law than the other domestic laws surveyed in this Note. German
hate speech laws are born out of the desire to address the
country's Nazi past and to prevent a revival of such movements.6
The German hate speech laws include criminal and civil
regulations that "protect against insult, defamation and other
forms of verbal assault, such as attacks against a person's honor or
integrity, damage to reputation, and disparaging the memory of
the dead."'67
The German government's strong commitment to address
hate speech has resulted in the controversial prohibition of
Holocaust denial.' The German Constitutional Court sees
Holocaust denial as a denial of the personal worth of the Jewish
people.69 Professor Rosenfeld considers Holocaust denial as
breaching society's duty to maintain an environment in which Jews
can feel part of the community." Germany, with its well-developed
body of hate speech law, represents yet another instance of a
nation taking initiative to prohibit hate speech.
v. Russia
In response to the growing issue of ethnic and nationalist
violence, Russia recently enacted the Federal Law on Countering
Extremist Activity (the Extremist Law)." A component of the
Extremist Law is the prohibition of hate speech that addresses
social, racial, nationalistic, and religious animosity.72 The Extremist
Law is a reflection of international human rights norms, such as
65. Id. at 1547.
66. Id. at 1550.
67. Id. at 1551.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1552.
70. Id.
71. J. Brian Gross, Russia's War on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal
of the Law "On Counteracting Extremist Activity," 2003 BYU L. REV. 717, 717 (2003).
72. Id. at 738.
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those listed in the ICCPR.73
Russia, a nation with a history of government oppression and
human rights violations,74 has attempted to address some of these
abuses by enacting the Extremist Law. Russia's initiative
demonstrates that a very influential non-western country is moving
to address the hate speech problem. Russia's criminalization of
hate speech adds to the international community's growing
concern with hate speech.
Hate speech can be very effective as a tool to disseminate the
idea of racial superiority, to incite violence, and to reinforce
stereotypes. Several nations, including the ones this Note surveys,
have taken notice of this problem and have addressed it through
legal action. The United States' approach is to balance the right to
free speech with prohibitions of hate speech. 5 Recent case law
demonstrates there is hope for hate speech legislation in the
United States. 6 The Canadian approach shows judicial and
legislative commitment to prohibiting hate speech.77 The United
Kingdom has an old and comprehensive tradition of anti-hate
speech laws." Germany, in response to its Nazi past, has developed
an extensive body of hate speech law. 9 Finally, Russia has
prohibited hate speech in an attempt to fight political extremism.8"
The domestic laws this Note surveys shows several examples
of how nations act out of a sense of legal obligation. These nations
believed hate speech was enough of a concern to take action to
prevent such speech. These nations' domestic laws evidence that
the prohibition of hate speech has become a CIL.
D. Jurists
Jurists have set forth their views about the dangers of hate
speech and the importance of preventing such speech from gaining
momentum. Jurists point out that hate speech may result in
discrimination or, at its worst, genocide.81  Professor Mari
73. See id. at 738-740.
74. See William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic
Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 249, 278-79 (2004).
75. See supra Part II.C.i.
76. See Demaske, supra note 50, at 315.
77. See supra Part II.C.ii.
78. Rosenfeld, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
79. Id. at 1550-51.
80. Gross, supra note 71, at 717,
81. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 23, at 144 (finding the link between hate speech and
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Matsuda,' a leading race theorist, has recognized there is an
"emerging international standard outlawing hate speech., 83
Professor Matsuda characterizes racist speech as a tool for
subordination, which reinforces a "historical vertical relationship"
between whites and blacks." Professor Matsuda adopts the
suggestion made by Professor Richard Delgado in his
breakthrough article Words that Wound," proposing a tort remedy
for injury from hate speech as well as criminal restrictions."
Other jurists have stressed the need for States to prevent hate
speech. Professor William Schabas' contends that preventing hate
speech is the key to preventing genocide.' Furthermore, Professor
Schabas argues that hate speech is the most efficient tool in
motivating the "willing executioners" to commit genocide. 9
Professor Stephanie Farrior ° also argues for hate speech
restrictions. According to Professor Farrior, a violation of hate
speech restrictions is a matter of international law because "failure
to restrict hate speech [constitutes] a failure to fulfill a state's
obligation to give effect to the right to equality and non-
discrimination."' Professor Kevin Boyle93 also warns about the
potential dangers of hate speech and advocates the position that
individuals should take a stand in fighting it.'
Jurists do not dictate international law. Jurists do, however,
influence the evolution of CIL or may reflect CIL in their works.95
These jurists' opinions explain some of the legal reasoning behind
genocide in Rwanda).
82. Professor of Law at Georgetown University School of Law.
83. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989).
84. Id. at 2358.
85. 17 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
86. Matsuda, supra note 83, at 2360.
87. Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway;
Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights.
88. See Schabas, supra note 23, at 144, 171.
89. See id. at 171.
90. Professor of Law at Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law.
91. See Farrior, supra note 43, at 96-98.
92. Id. at 97.
93. Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights Centre at the University of
Essex in Colchester, England. Professor Boyle practices regularly before the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
94. See Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech - The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53
ME. L. REV. 487, 501-02 (2001).
95. See Goldsmith II, supra note 17, at 1117.
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the Hagan holding and demonstrate the emerging CIL prohibiting
hate speech.
The state of international law, domestic law, and the opinions
of jurists demonstrate that the international community recognizes
an arising CIL prohibiting hate speech. If the Committee, which is
an international body, considered the views and legal norms of the
contemporary international society in its holding, then the holding
was justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Committee in Hagan v. Australia held the word "nigger"
is offensive within the "circumstances of contemporary society." 6
Since Australian Aboriginal society did not deem the sign
offensive, which "contemporary society" was the Committee
considering?
This Note proposed that the Hagan Committee based its
holding on circumstances of international contemporary society.
As shown in this Note, international contemporary society
recognizes that hate speech is prohibited as a matter of CIL. CIL
arises out of international norms that ripen into law, and
international treaties, international courts' decisions, domestic law,
opinions of jurists, all amount to evidence that a CIL exists. In this
Note, international treaties, the decision of an international court,
domestic law of nations, and jurists' works were analyzed to
determine whether a CIL regarding hate speech exists.
The ICCPR and the ICERD both prohibit hate speech. The
ICTR recognized hate speech is a violation of the CIL that
prohibits discrimination. The actions of these international organs
demonstrate the international community's condemnation of hate
speech. Beyond simple condemnation, however, the treaty
provisions show that the international community is also ready to
punish and prevent the propagation of hate speech. Nations,
however, do not always follow international treaties.' Therefore,
to find out whether nations follow the prohibition of hate speech
out of a sense of legal obligation, the Note surveyed several
nations' domestic laws regarding hate speech.
The nations surveyed were the Untied States, Canada, the
96. Hagan 7.3.
97. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 9 (showing how the Australian government refused to
comply with the terms of a treaty as interpreted by the United Nations).
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United Kingdom, Germany, and Russia. These nations are
influential in the legal and political arenas. Nations such as the
United States and Canada do not have a well-developed body of
law prohibiting hate speech. However, these nations do show
commitment to anti-hate speech law by giving room to this type of
law in judicial decisions and legislation. Nations such as the United
Kingdom, Germany and Russia have a well-developed body of
hate speech law that reflects their dedication to eradicating hate
speech. The fact these nations chose to address hate speech
indicates that they may be acting out of a sense of legal obligation.
Jurists have also condemned hate speech and asked for the
prohibition of such speech. Jurists warned that hate speech may
result in discrimination and even genocide. These scholars
suggested a variety of methods to address hate speech, including
the creation of a tort remedy and criminal sanctions. The jurists'
attention to hate speech demonstrates that a prohibition of hate
speech has in fact become CIL.
If in fact there is an emerging CIL prohibiting hate speech,
the issue remains as to whether there is speech that is universally
"hate speech," since specific guidelines of what is "hate speech"
may be a cultural construct. The international community must
draft an international agreement specifying the universal definition
of hate speech as well as how, if at all, hate speech should be
prevented and punished.
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